A sustainable fiscal state needs to have two critical factors: A stable tax base and access to an efficient bond market. The Tokugawa Shogunate had a stable land tax revenue, which was inherited to modern Japan after the Meiji restoration. Taxation, however, was restricted by the constitution after the Meiji restoration. The parliament opposed to expansionary policy in the early 1890s, and then it turned to support that at the exchange of governmental commitment to investment in social infrastructure. The government committed to investment to increase productivity, and was allowed to raise tax rate. About the bond market, at the other hand, the government had issued bonds only in the domestic market until the mid 1890s. In the late 1890s, after Japan joined the international gold standard, the government began to issue considerable amount of bonds, and the balance surged during the Russo-Japanese war in [1904][1905]. Now the London market efficiently financed Japanese government. In the early 20th century, the government was one and only one player that had established its own reputation in the international financial market. Hence balance of Japanese government bonds was the only route to import capital. This route also provided Japanese economy with macroeconomic stability, offsetting short-term current account deficit by import of capital. Japan had finally been equipped with necessary instruments as a stable and sustainable fiscal state.
Introduction
Tokugawa Japan had relatively stronghold of stable tax basis, as a feudalist country, and this was an important legacy for the New Imperial Government after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The New Imperial government, after taking over the early modern tax basis, formed the modern domestic bond market first, and then went into the London market, to settle the fiscal system in the financial market so that it could be efficiently financed. To understand this process of rise of the Japanese fiscal state, it would be helpful to inquire three aspects.
The first one is process of centralizing taxation and stabilizing tax revenue. A nationwide tax and land reform by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who was the ruling samurai then, was the landmark of simplification and centralization of taxation in feudalist Japan. By this reform, the central government and feudalist states (hans) acquired strong tax control. The tax payment ratio in agricultural crop reached as high as 40 percent. This regime was inherited to the Tokugawa Shogunate. This was the historical origin of feudalist Japan, where fiscal stability was high as a feudalist country. This legacy of strong taxation scheme was took over by the New Imperial Government after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The New Imperial Government conducted a big tax and land reform again, by which autonomy of feudal states was removed and all tax revenue of the country came under control of the central government.
The second one is the big change of political environment after Japan developed into a constitutional state in 1890, which meant the taxation and expenditure had to be approved by the parliament. In the process of modernization and Westernization, people had grown up as "citizens" who thought they had the right to control taxation and expenditure. The New Imperial Government had no other option than to change into a constitutional state in order to justify their rule. In the early 1890s, right after the constitution became effective and the parliament was called first, the parliament was a battle field where the majority of representatives strongly asserted the tax cut and the administration, which was not elected from representatives in the period and sought expansion of military expenditure. However, in the late 1890s, they moved to the other equilibrium where the parliament agreed to tax increase and the administration increased expenditure for civil capital formation, not only for military. Stable tax revenue and public capital formation became the rule of fiscal policy since then.
The third one is the government's access to the bond market. While some feudalist states issued bonds and notes which were permitted to circulate only within the issuer state in Tokugawa Japan, the Tokugawa Shogunate, the central government, did not issue bonds, so that the Shogunate capital Edo (later Tokyo) and Osaka, the two biggest cities ruled by the Shogunate, did not have any secondary bond market. The role of capital market in fiscal policy was negligible in Tokugawa Japan. The New Imperial Government began to issue government bonds right after the Meiji Restoration, which was the historical origin of the modern capital market in Japan. However, because the New Imperial Government considered the risk of being colonized by Western powers, it had hesitated to issue government bonds in international markets until the late 1890s. The circumstances gradually changed in the mid 1890s. Leaving from the silver standard and joining the gold standard in 1897 decreased Japan's country risk that led to smaller country premium rate required when to issue government bonds. A big turning point came in [1904] [1905] when Japan was in a war against Russia. Japanese government finally decided to issue huge amount of Japanese Government Bonds at the London market, endorsed by British merchant banks, to afford the Russo-Japanese war. Both of this issue and the war were successful, and then connection to the international capital market became an important instrument both for fiscal stability and for macroeconomic stability. Issuing bonds in the international market could decrease "crowding out" effect in the small domestic capital market, so that the government had a more flexible arm to raise funds. Also, import of capital when the current account deficit increased enabled the Bank of Japan, the central bank, to take a more moderate financial policy. Otherwise the Bank of Japan should have increased interest rate suddenly to keep the parity of Japanese yen against the starling pound any time current account deficit surged. In the 1900s, when Japanese private companies had not yet established their own reputation in the international financial market, Japanese Government Bond was the dominant channel to import capital. Thus fiscal policy gave the macroeconomic stability to Japanese economy, and the macroeconomic stability in turn provided the government with stable tax revenue.
In the phase where Japan developed to a modern "fiscal state," therefore, the well-functioning international financial market centered at London took a critical role. However, at the same time, if the government had made a mistake about when to enter the international market, Japan could have faced with the risk to be colonized. After establishing a constitutional state, creating a nation state, and being heavily armed, then the Japanese government got into the London financial market without being politically threatened. Whether exploiting or being exploited by the London market was a critical junction to the first rising non-Western country.
I. Formation and development of early modern fiscal state: 1192-1867
A. From an ancient empire to a feudalist country Since the late 6th century, ruling family in the Kinki region, 1 the ruling family, which was later called the imperial family, had made efforts to introduce sophisticated political institutions and technologies from the Chinese empire. In 701, the Taiho Imperial Legal Codes (Taiho Ritsuryo), a land mark of ancient legal history was promulgated. That legal codes was a modified copy of the legal codes of the Chinese empire, written in classical Chinese. The Imperial Legal Codes stipulated very centralized scheme of legal and political system, but the Imperial Government did not hold sufficient resources to really enforce the scheme. The Imperial Government therefore delegated duties to keep orders in segmented domains to the Imperial family, nobles and large temples, and those delegatees were guaranteed privileges to collect some portion of rents from the relevant areas. This was an origin of Japanese manorial system. In many manors, real enforcement power was provided professional worriers, not by the owners of manor. Those worriers came to be called "samurai"s, which originally meant "servants." samurais were delegated duties to keep orders and peace in local communities, and to collect tax, at the exchange of the privilege to correct some rent for themselves. By the 11th century, in some regions, especially in Eastern Japan which is far away from Kyoto, the Imperial Capital, samurais formed groups led by noble samurais, 2 and had acquired enough power to rule the areas.
In 1192, a big group of samurais in Eastern Japan finally established their own government, the Kamakura Shogunate. samurais did not follow the Imperial Legal Codes, but they did their common law. The court of the Shogunate enforced this Japanese common law. However, in terms of the fiscal regime, the Kamakura Shogunate was basically a part of the manorial system at least in the 12th century. The main revenue of the Shogunate was from manors the Shogunate family held, and income of samurais still depended on rent guaranteed by owners of manors. A critical feature with the manorial system was in that sovereignty to rule people and to correct taxes from them was not explicitly distinguished from ownership of land that allowed the owner to claim residual return, and in that either sovereignty over or ownership of land was fragmented. Typical case was as follows: The sovereignty over a piece of land officially belonged to the Emperor, the highest-rank duty to rule the piece of land was delegated to the Imperial family (Imperial family as private agents) with privilege to collect some rent, some high-rank duty with privilege to collect rent was delegated to high-class nobles such as the Fujiwara family, 3 middle-rank duty with privilege to collect rent was delegated to middle-class metropolitan nobles or local nobles, and the low-rank duty to keep orders and to really collect land taxes from peasants cultivating the piece of land was delegated to local samurais with some privilege to collect rent at the exchange of their duty. Thus a fragmented stratus of sovereignty and ownership was built on the same piece of land.
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Samurais were delegated to only the lowest rank of duty, but they had the real power for enforcement. Since then samurais therefore gradually eluded the manorial system and expanded their interests. In the 14-15th centuries, Japan entered the period of warfares, when the manorial system was almost destroyed.
B. Land and tax reform in the 1590s
The period of warfares ended by Nobunaga Oda, the ruling samurai, and his successor, Hideyoshi Toyotomi. Given the virtually destroyed manorial system, Toyotomi's government conducted a drastic land and tax reform in the 1590s. The essential factors of his reform were, 1)he officially denied the fragmented sovereignty over land, declared that land of whole Japan belonged officially to him, and delegated one and only one feudal lord he recognized as his subordinate the duty to rule a certain domain with the authority to collect tax; 2)he determined the standard of taxation and ordered his feudal lords to commit to certain tax rates to peasants; 3)he guaranteed the right to occupy and cultivate a piece of land to one and only one registered peasant on the piece of land. Now a piece of land had one and only one lord who held authority of taxation and one and only one holder of the right of cultivation. Provided that feudal lords were forced to commit to 2 They were originally sent by the Imperial government as governors or bureaucrats, and then stayed the areas. 3 The family led assembling the Imperial Legal Codes in the 8th century. 4 Nagahara (1973) . some explicit taxation policies and were prohibited from discretionarily imposing taxes, each peasant virtually had the right to acquire residual crop after he paid tax. Toyotomi conducted the reform to maximize land tax revenue in the long term by protecting the residual claim of peasants.
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C. Revenue stability of the Tokugawa Japan When Ieyasu Tokugawa took over the government from the Toyotomi family and established the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603, he inherited this scheme of explicitly committed taxation policy with guaranteed property right of peasantry. Taxation mainly consisted of three kinds of items. The first one is called "Primary Tax (Hon nengu)," "Small Crops (Ko mono nari)," and "Charter Fee (Myoga kin)" and other kinds of indirect taxes. "Primary Tax" is land tax officially denominated by the amount of rice, and considerable portion of that was indeed paid in kind. The measure of crop and tax was "Koku." One Koku is 180.39litters, which was thought to be standard amount for an individual to live a year, so that productivity of a domoain measured by "Koku" was supposed to also show the amount of human resources that could be mobilized for warfares. "Small crops" were imposed on other crops than rice. "Charter Fee" were imposed on privileged merchants mainly in big cities such as Osaka, Edo, renamed to Tokyo after the Meiji restoration, and Kyoto.
The "Primary Tax" was indeed the main source of revenue in Tokugawa Japan. The Shogunate and feudal lords conducted inspection of rice production in their domains from the 1590s to the 1600s, and the result was registered at the Tokugawa Shogunate. This registered estimation of crop was the tax base of "Primary Tax." By the early 18th century, the taxation policy was based sharecropping. The Shogunate and feudal lords committed to some tax rate, such as 40 percent or 50 percent, and unless the crop was very bad, the tax rate was imposed on crop of the year.
In the early 18th century, the Tokugawa Shogunate changed its taxation policy. Under the new policy, the amount of tax was fixed. The Shogunate inspected crop of each peasant for the latest several years up to the inspection year, and then determined the tax amount for his farm, and this fixed amount of tax instead of rate was effective for next several years. Thus, while peasants took on more risk of bad cropping, they were given more incentive to increase production, given that all residual after tax deduction belonged to them.
Feudalist Japan was fragmented to small states and domains governed by different feudal lords, and each lord held taxation autonomy. While it is difficult to show tax revenue of all feudal lords, about the Tokugawa Shogunate, the central government, revenue of "Primary Tax" is available from 1716 to 1841. After the reform of taxation in the 1710s, tax revenue moderately increased, which indicated that the new taxation policy gave peasants stronger incentives. This shows the tax revenue of the Tokugawa Shogunate was fairly stable.
[ Figure 1 ].
Araki (1986).
While tax officially amounted to near 35 percent in the period (Figure 1 ), we should be careful because this ratio was based on the official expectation of crop. Mainly based on crop inspections in the 17th century, official expected crop was determined as tax base. This official expected crop was hardly changed, thus official expected crop of whole the Shogunate domain was stable, except for minor changes in acreage of the domain. Officially expected crop per acreage of land seems to have been stable.
However, Hayami and Miyamoto (1988) estimates the country wide crop increased from 31 million kokus in 1700 to 41 million kokus in 1850, and land productivity (crop per cho) also increased since 1700 (Table 1) .
[ Table 1 ].
In the Tokugawa Shogunate Domain, tax rate ratio generally lower than other feudal lords' domains, and autonomy of villages were stronger, hence peasants had stronger incentives to increase productivity. Thus the increase of crop in the Tokugawa Shogunate Domain in the period is supposed to have been considerable. As a conservative estimation, we applied the countrywide increase rate of land productivity to the Shogunate Domain, and estimated real crop in the 18-19th centuries, and then effective tax rate.
6 Based on this estimation of crop, effective tax rate drop below 30 percent in the early 19th century. The Tokugawa Shogunate provided strong incentives to increase productivity with peasants, but the fruit belonged to peasants themselves, not to the Shogunate.
This bargaining result favorable to peasants was partly due to the structure of governance itself. The Shogunate deployed few officials in rural area, and it was a delegated duty of villages to keep order, and to collect tax. Taxation policy including tax amount imposed on a village was a kind of contract between the Shoguate and the village. As long as the village paid the prescribed tax, the village kept its autonomy. This was an efficient way of collecting tax, and economizing costs of ruling society. However, small number of officials meant that harsh asymmetric information existed between the village and the Shogunate. Given this asymmetric information, ex-post renegotiation of taxation policy accompanied large costs. When the crop was bad, due to natural disaster for instance, the village called for temporal tax cut. Because the Shogunate wanted to stabilize tax revenue in the long term, and really bad crop was easy to observe, it basically accepted this kind of tax cut. However, incremental increase of productivity 6 Put y t and y t+n as crop in the t th year and (t + n) th year. Then average growth rate r between t th year and (t + n) th year is shown by r = (y t+n /y t ) 1/n − 1. From the Table 1 , we have average growth rate r in 1720-1730, 1730-1750, 1750-1800, and 1800-1850. "Officially expected crop in the domain" (a) in the Appendix I can be interpreted as a proxy of acreage rather than real crop. Thus we can estimate crop in the t the year b t by For 1721 For -1730 For , 1731 For -1750 For , 1751 For -1800 , and 1801-1841, we used r calculated by the procedure above. Before 1720, we assume that the "Officially expected crop a" was fairly close to real crop, thus we inserted a 1716 to a 1720 as b 1716 to b 1720 . was hard to observe from the Shogunate side, and any renegotiation for tax increase incurred huge cost on the Shogunate, which strongly depended on autonomous villages as instruments of governance. Therefore, while the Shogunate could keep the stable land tax revenue, marginal increase of agricultural productivity drained from the Shogunate treasury.
Consequently, the Shogunate came to rely more on indirect taxes from merchants in the big cities in the mid 19th century (Table 2 ). Increased expenditure for salaries and civil services forced the Shogunate to find new revenue sources (Table 3 ).
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[ Even though the imbalance between stable land tax and increasing expenditure was a serious problem to the Shogunate, the Shogunate did not issue neither bonds nor notes.
8 The Shogunate allowed other feudal lords to issue bonds and notes that circulated only within their own territories, but the Shogunate itself never issued. Because the Shogunate exclusively held the currency sovereignty to issue coins, it could acquire extra revenue by re-coinage to deteriorated quality coins (Table 2 ). This was a useful inflation tax to transfer from the private sector to the government sector, but only temporarily. The Shogunate can be said to had stable tax base, but not to have had any sustainable institution to finance the government.
II. The Meiji Restoration: 1868-1889

A. Abolition of feudalist system and fiscal centralization
The Tokugawa Shogunate exclusively had held the sovereignty over diplomacy and national security. However, when Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry of the US Navy arrived with 4 battleships at Uraga of the Edo bay, the Shogunate could not exclude them. Furthermore, when he came back in the next year with 7 battleships this time, the Shogunate concluded a treaty of peace and amity under which Japan was obliged to open Shimoda Port in Shizuoka and Hakodate Port in Hokkaido, to provide the United States with a most-favored-nation treatment, to accept a consul at Shimoda port, and to give the US consular jurisdiction, but the US was obliged to give Japan neither a most-favored-nation treatment nor consular jurisdiction. Under the Tokugawa ideology, peasants had obligation to pay tax while the samurais had the responsibility to national security. Thus a historically shameful treaty with a foreign country made feudal lords and people sceptical against the Tokugawa Shogunate sovereignty.
In 1858, the Shogunate concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United States, under which Japan was obliged to open Yokohama, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo as treaty ports, to accept the free trade mechanism, and to give up tariff autonomy. This sudden joining the international market provided Japan with a drastic change of relative prices, where huge loss belonged to relatively disadvantaged industries, and huge gain to relatively advantaged industries. This drastic change meant destroyed was the existing commercial network which large merchants privileged by the Shogunate had managed. Losing ability to control politics and economy, the Shogunate lost to the Boshin Civil War with the State of Choshu and the State of Satsuma, on the side of which the Emperor stood, in 1868. In 1871, the New Imperial Government abolished any autonomy of 260 feudal states and domains, and declared sovereignty all over Japan exclusively belonged to the New Imperial Government. Feudal lords received government bonds to compensate their financial benefit from their domains, but they lost any authority against their domains. Now all tax revenue of the country belonged to the central government.
B. Land tax reform in the 1870s
In Tokugawa Japan, a registered peasant exclusively held the right to cultivate his registered farm and to take residual after tax payment. However, he could not freely sell his farm, or at least, the Shogunate court did not enforce any contract of trading registered farm. 10 In 1872, the New Imperial Government officially allowed farm holding peasants to sell and buy their farm. Then, in 1873, the Land Tax Act was promulgated. The act guaranteed modern property right of farm to the registered farmer at the exchange of tax payment. Also the act prescribed that land tax be paid by money, not in kind. Procedure of the tax reform was as follows: First the prefectural government inspected productivity of a piece of land and calculated average return from the piece of land; second, the prefectural government determined the principle value from the calculated return and prescribed the principle value as the "land price"; third, 3 percent of the "land price" is the designated land tax from the piece of land. Thus the "land price" was the new tax base, and this "price" was fixed and had no direct relation with real trades in the market.
Another object in enforcement of the act was to have stable land tax revenue. Because the New Imperial Government had announced the land tax would be cut before it defeated the Shogunate in order to gather people's support, some peasants rose in revolt. Riots were suppressed by the Imperial Army nation-widely deployed, but also the government had to concede: tax rate of "land price" was reduced to 2.5 percent.
That effort was so effective that land tax revenue increased rapidly in the early 1870s, and it is thought to have recovered to the level in the Tokugawa period in the mid 1870s (Figure 2 ).
[Figure 2].
However, in 1877, the New Imperial Government faced with the last civil war with exsamurais in Kyushu region, which incurred huge costs on the government. The government issued considerable amount of government notes, and it led to rapid inflation. Since the "land prices" were fixed, inflation meant tax cut in real term. This real tax reduction stimulated rural economy.
In 1882, Masayoshi Matsukata took over the chair of Minister of Finance, and started harsh deflationary policy, where the government repaid the government notes by the budget surplus (Appendix 3). While the primary object of this deflationary policy was to stabilize prices and financial system, another important by-product was real increase of land tax. This deflationary policy gave disastrous damages to rural economy especially in Eastern Japan, partly because it started occasionally at the same time European economy turned down in 1882. Silk reeling was the export industry of Eastern Japan, so that the region hit both by the international business cycle and the fiscal policy.
Therefore, it is not clear whether Matsukata's deflationary policy increased social welfare or not, 11 but it stabilized the budget of the government anyway. In the 1880s, the governmental budget strongly depended on the land tax ( Figure 2 ) and its dependence was actually as high as it was in the mid Tokugawa period (Table 2 ). In terms of tax base, the New Imperial Government in the late 19th century relied on the Tokugawa heritage.
C. Government Bonds in the domestic capital market
As an effort to modernize financial system, the government promulgated the National Bank Act in 1872, which was a copy of American national bank system, so that national banks were actually joint stock companies that held privilege to issue bank notes as currency. Under this act, 153 national banks were established. Correspondence network among those national banks began to integrate fragmented financial markets.
Departing from the Tokugawa shogunate policy for the central government not to issue notes nor bonds, the New Imperial Government issued government notes and bonds from the very beginning. Transformation of feudal lords' revenue to government consul bonds also increased the amount of circulating government bonds. The bond market therefore emerged in the 1870s. This was the birth of the capital market in Japan.
Thus infant financial and stock markets were being formed in the 1870s. After he took his office, Matsukata, the Minister of Finance, was dedicated to also complete modernization of financial system. Under his leadership, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the state-backed foreign exchange bank, was established in 1880. Also he chose the British style of central banking as a better system, so he established the Bank of Japan in 1882 as the central bank that exclusively issue bank notes. The Bank of Japan began to allow the bank notes to be convert to the silver coins of Japanese yen.
12 Since then, the Bank of Japan held the silver standard until October 1897, when it moved to the gold standard.
Provided that the value of currency had become stable and modern financial market was formed, the government acquired a well-functioning government bonds market. Since the late 1870s, the balance of issued domestic bonds gradually increased (Figure 3) . The domestic bond market had become a sustainable instrument to finance the government.
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[ Figure 3 ].
III. Fiscal state under the constitution: 1890-1914 A. Rivals in the parliament
In 1889, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was proclaimed. The constitution basically followed the one of Prussia, and it gave a strong power to the lower house as well as the upper house consisting of nobles and other characters chosen by the government: The budget of each year had to be approved by both houses. If the government failed to pass the budget, it had to enforce the budget of the last year. Following the Prussian constitution, the constitution did not officially take the parliamentary cabinet system, while the leading drafter of the constitution, Hirofumi Itoh, thought Japan should move to the parliamentary cabinet system soon or later. In the early 1890s, the prime minister and other ministers ware appointed independently to the parliament. On the other hand, the opposition parties kept the majority of the lower house.
The government sought to build a strong military, to stand against the Western powers. On the other hand, the opposition parties led by the Liberal Party were supported by rich landowners, who cared more of economic development than military. Thus the majority of the lower house strongly called for large tax cut. However, the opposition parties had also a weak point. The Clause 67 of the constitution prescribed that items belonging to the imperial sovereignty in the budget could not be cut by the parliament without approvement by the cabinet. A typical item belonging to the imperial sovereignty was military expenditure, that took a large part of the budget in that period. Therefore, unless the cabinet approved, the parliament could not cut the military expenditure. Given the structure of the constitution, harsh rivalry between the parliament and the cabinet gave any benefit neither to the cabinet nor to the parliament.
The Sino-Japanese war, whose main issue was the "independence" of Korea against China, gave a momentum. This was the first war since the Mongolian invasion to Japan in the 13th century. Facing with a national event, the parliament stop to fight the cabinet, and approved a large increase of military expenditure. 12 In this period Mexican dollar was the key currency in treaty ports of East Asia, so 1 Japanese yen coin contained the same amount of silver that 1 Mexican dollar did.
13 Kamiyama (1995) , Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) .
B. Increasing tax with increasing capital formation
After the price index dropped in the mid 1880s, it began to inflate again since the late 1880s. This was mainly because Japan took the silver standard. From the 1870s to the 1880s, most European countries decided to accept the gold standard, which led to the decline of the international silver price. This meant decreasing exchange rate of Japanese yen. Under the silver standard, the Bank of Japan controlled the domestic financial market to have exchange rate of Japanese yen fixed on the international silver price. Low exchange rate finally led to inflation of domestic prices. A serious result of the inflation was decrease of governmental revenue in real term, given that the "land price" was nominally fixed, hence the land tax was too. The cabinet desperately sought land tax increase.
On the side of the opposition parties, the Liberal Party, the leading opposition party, drastically changed its stance against the cabinet, after the Sino-Japanese war. Under the effect of clause 67 of the constitution, the parliament could not increase expenditure for public welfare. Therefore, the party finally approved the land tax increase at the exchange of the cabinet's commitment to considerable increase in expenditure for public welfare, especially for social infrastructure. This strategic change of the Liberal Party resulted in the establishment of the de facto parliamentary cabinet system, where the majority of the lower house held the cabinet. 14 The effect of the structural change in politics was remarkable. The government expenditure in the Gross National Expenditure steadily increased since the mid 1890s (Figure 4) . Not only the military expenditure, also the governmental non-military capital formation surged in the late 1890s, showing that the cabinet indeed committed to investment in social infrastructure. Especially from the late 1890s to the early 1900, the period of Japanese industrial revolution, the governmental investment in infrastructure had a considerable role ( Figure 5 ). 
C. Government Bonds in the international capital market
Except for the very beginning of the New Imperial Government, the government had hesitate to issue government bonds in the international market, because it considered the risk of being a dependency on Western powers. The victory in the Sino-Japanese war mitigated this consideration.
In October, 1897, Japan switched from the silver standard to the gold standard. A reason of the decision was in access to the international financial market. As long as Japanese yen pegged to silver, issue of bonds in the London market would require some premium to compensate the downward risk of the silver price. The government indeed resumed issuing government bonds in the London market in 1898 (Figure 3) . Government bonds issue shot up during the RussoJapanese war from 1904 to 1905. After the war, the London market had kept its critical role in 14 Mitani (1995) . Japanese fiscal policy. To avoid high interest rate in the domestic market directly, hence to calm crowding-out effect indirectly, the government actively issued bonds in the London market after the Russo-Japanese war.
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Moving to the gold standard and joining the international financial market centered at the London market had important implication both in handling government budget and in sustaining macroeconomic stability. In Japan as a developing country, governmental investment in infrastructure took a critical role. However, even if investment in social infrastructure could increase productivity in the long term, governmental expenditure and investment themselves stimulated effective demand in the domestic economy in the short term that led to the current account deficit. If the Japanese capital market had effectively been integrated in the international market, this current account deficit in the short term would not be a serious problem. Expecting increased productivity, capital inflow would offset the short-term current account deficit, so that the Bank of Japan, which was responsible for the value of yen against the hard currency, did not need to trigger a financial panic by a sudden increase of interest rate as an instrument to have the domestic demand suddenly shrink. 16 However, in the early 20th century, no Japanese firm established its own reputation in the international market, hence it could not be expected for the private sector to successfully import capital.
By defeating Russia, only the government established its own reputation in the international financial market. Therefore, if any importer of capital, the government was one and only one. Issuing the government bonds in the international market was a critical macroeconomic stabilizer for a emerging country.
The government gave a contract the Yokohama Specie Bank, a partly state-owned foreign exchange bank, to issue bonds. The London branch office of the Yokohama Specie Bank have British merchant banks endorse the bonds, and then sell the bonds. The gold standard before the World War I was basically the sterling pound exchange standard, hence reserve of the starling pound supported trust in the yen. The balance at the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank was then included into reserve of the Bank of Japan. The Bank of Japan considered not only its own reserve in Japan, also reserve at the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank, when it determined official discount rate.
17 As long as the London market expected that Japanese economy was on a sustainable growth path, Japanese government was financed, which meant Japanese economy was financed too.
After the Russo-Japanese war, not only the international financial market provided a sustainable channel of fund raising with the government, capital import through the government bonds had become an important instrument to keep macroeconomic stability of Japan.
For this mechanism to work well, the market had to be efficient, in terms of imposing risk premium. Otherwise the governmental budget would just lose discipline. Or, the fiscal stability could be hurt if the market were instable. For instance, the American economy had been attacked by instable international financial market in the 19th century. In that sense, joining the London market in the early 20th century was a good decision. Exactly at that time, financial market was globally integrated and the London market functioned very well as the center.
Conclusion
The Tokugawa Shogunate guaranteed the right to cultivate and to take residual after tax payment to registered peasants, and respected autonomy of local communities as long as those communities took responsibility to tax payment. This institution gave the Shogunate a s table land tax base. This land tax kept being the main revenue not only to the Tokugawa Shogunate, also to the New Imperial Government after the Meiji restoration.
After 1890, the constitution admitted the authority to approve budget to the lower house, while the government was eager to increase tax revenue in order to enhance military ability. The leading opposition party chose a way where the party approved increased expenditure on the one hand, the government committed to investment in social infrastructure. Japanese democracy finished its youth at that point, and the fiscal policy came to have internalize a sustainable mechanism to invest in infrastructure and to increase tax revenue.
Facing with short of revenue during its centralization process, the New Imperial Government had issued bonds in the domestic market since the 1870s. Establishment of modern financial system facilitated it. However, the domestic market was not sufficiently large especially when the government came to take an important role in building infrastructure. Therefore Japan moved from the silver standard to the gold standard in 1897, and accessed the international financial market. The government indeed began to issue bonds in the London market in the late 1890s, and the balance surged during the Russo-Japanese war from [1904] [1905] . Now the government had a stable instrument to finance itself.
The channel to the London market had another implication. In the early 20th century, any Japanese firm had not established its own reputation in the international capital market. Thus the government bonds was the route to import capital. This channel enabled the government and the Bank of Japan to hold growth-oriented fiscal and monetary policy, without considering short-term current account deficit too much.
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